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Abstract 
George Akerlof is forever associated with his landmark 1970 paper, ‘The market for “lemons”’, 
which transformed the way economists approach markets where there is a difference between the 
transacting agents in the information they possess. This concept of asymmetric information, with 
its major impact on many fields of economics, was singled out when, in 2001, he was awarded 
the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics (along with Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz). A 
more comprehensive assessment of his contribution to economics would be as providing a better 
behavioural underpinning for macroeconomics as a major figure in the New Keynesian 
movement.  
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Article 
George Akerlof's father came to the United States from Sweden to obtain a Ph.D. at the 
University of Pennsylvania, and remained in the country to pursue a career as a research chemist. 
He met George's mother while she was a graduate student in chemistry. Hers was an academic 
family. George's great grandfather was among the earliest graduates from the University of 
California at Berkeley (in 1873), and his grandfather also graduated from Berkeley. Other 
members on that side of the family also established successful academic careers. George grew up 
on the East Coast, where his father held a series of posts, variously at Yale University, at the 
Mellon Institute in Pittsburgh and at Princeton University, before running his own independent 
research firm in the Princeton area. Indeed, it was witnessing the uncertainty surrounding his 
father's continuing employment, dependent as it was on securing government research grants, 
which first turned George Akerlof's mind to macroeconomic themes such as unemployment. As 
an undergraduate at Yale he majored in mathematics and economics, and in the fall of 1962 he 
entered graduate school at MIT, where he had the good fortune to find himself one of an 
exceptionally talented cohort of students. His doctoral supervisor was Robert Solow (Nobel 
Laureate 1987). Akerlof joined the Berkeley faculty in the fall of 1966 and, although he has 
spent extended periods away from Berkeley – at the Indian Statistical Institute in New Delhi, the 
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Council of Economic Advisors, the Federal Reserve Board (where he met his wife, Janet 
Yellen), the LSE, and the Brookings Institution – he has remained closely identified with 
Berkeley ever since.  
 
The ‘Market for “lemons”’ paper 
For the generations of economics students trained since 1970, when asked to single out a favorite 
economics article, it is a pretty safe bet that the most popular article would be George Akerlof's 
(1970) paper on asymmetric information, ‘The market for “lemons”’. Part of this paper's appeal 
lies in its modelling approach. While mathematically rigorous, it is derived from close 
observation of the world. Care is taken to incorporate realistic economic detail, yet the results 
obtained provide tremendously powerful insights. The reader is left with an understanding of an 
important market situation that was previously obscure and, in addition, is offered policy options 
whereby economic well-being can be improved. This general approach characterizes all of 
Akerlof's work.  
The ‘lemons’ paper starts by offering an analysis of the second-hand car market in which the 
existence of lower-quality vehicles (the eponymous ‘lemons’) can disrupt the workings of the 
market – to the extent that the usual economic law of lowering the price in the face of an excess 
of supply (or difficulty experienced in selling into the market) simply makes matters worse. 
Rather than bringing about a market equilibrium through matching supply and demand, the lower 
price drives out the better-quality cars remaining in the market and this further depresses 
demand.  
The problem arises from an asymmetry of information that exists between those supplying used 
cars into the market (they know, in considerable detail, just how good or otherwise their present 
car is) and those who are buying in the market (they can obviously inspect the car, but are left 
with substantially less knowledge than the seller). If those on the demand side use the price as an 
indication of the average quality of car traded, this can cause demand to decline in the face of 
falling prices – if, as seems reasonable, the suppliers with better-quality cars withhold them as 
the price falls, leaving only the poorer-quality cars to be offered at lower prices. Note that this 
problem does not arise in the new car market. While this market is, unfortunately, not free from 
‘lemons’, the probability of being stuck with a lemon can be ascertained from sources such as 
consumer reports. The fraction of new cars entering the market as lemons does not vary with the 
price or discount offered on new cars.  
Varian (1992, p. 469) offers the following simple characterization of the model. Assume there is 
a quality-of-car index q, which is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Additionally, assume 
the demand for cars is a function of this quality to the extent that the price offered for cars of 
quality q is exactly (3/2)q and that, on the other side of the market, suppliers with a car of quality 
q would be willing to sell for price q or better. There is clearly scope for mutually beneficial 
trade in this market, as any price between q and (3/2)q leaves both the buyer and seller of a car 
with quality q better off.  
On the other hand, if the buyer is unable to perceive the quality of the car but has to rely on the 
average quality of cars traded in the second-hand market as a measure of the expected quality of 
any car purchased, then the price offered is (3/2)q*, where q* is the average quality in the 
market.  
But on the supply side, of course, sellers know the exact quality of their cars and, for any price p, 
only those with quality p or lower will offer cars for sale. Thus, the observed quality of cars 
traded at price p will be p/2. However, at quality p/2 there will be no cars demanded, as cars of 
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this average quality fetch an offer of only (3/2)q*=(3/2)(p/2)=(3/4)p. So no cars will traded at 
this price. But nor will a fall in the price offer any improvement because, if price falls, then so 
too will the quality of car offered to the market and the average quality of cars observed. As 
things stand, there is no price that will allow cars to be traded. Potentially mutually advantageous 
trades are not made. Economic welfare is lower than it might be. The culprit is, of course, 
asymmetric information.  
It is the inability of the supply side of the market (which possesses the hidden information about 
car quality) to meaningfully communicate this information to the buyers that undermines the 
potential for mutually advantageous trades. The existence of lemons inhibits the proper 
functioning of the market. Akerlof points out that the inability of older people to secure health-
care insurance, the inability of minorities to secure decent employment prospects, the external 
costs of dishonest business practices, and the difficulty developing countries experience in 
establishing capital markets can all be viewed as manifestations of the same ‘lemons’ problem, 
i.e., asymmetric information.  
In awarding the 2001 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics to George Akerlof, Michael Spence 
and Joseph Stiglitz, the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences cited ‘their analyses of markets 
with asymmetric information’. In reviewing the contributions of these prize winners, Rosser 
(2003) identifies a nascent discussion of this idea in the earlier economics literature, but there is 
little doubt that it was with the publication of Akerlof's 1970 ‘Market for “lemons”’ paper that 
the metaphorical light bulb was switched on in the economics community and the idea of 
asymmetric information started to become integrated into economics. As a recent survey by 
Riley (2001) makes clear, this concept is now an important feature of modern approaches to 
development economics, financial economics, industrial organization, international economics, 
labour economics, and many other areas. It is now difficult to imagine the world of economics 
without this insight.  
 
Other work 
While for many people the ‘lemons’ paper stands as a seminal example of the power of 
microeconomic analysis, the underlying motivation that led Akerlof to investigate this area was 
actually macroeconomic. Cyclical fluctuations in the car market were seen as a major 
destabilizing factor in the macroeconomy: hence the original research effort. Throughout his 
career Akerlof has been driven by a desire to develop macroeconomics in a way that allows 
problems such as unemployment to be better understood. Never happy with the neoclassical 
synthesis and distinctly critical of the New Classical economics, Akerlof has been a major 
contributor to the development of New Keynesian Economics (2002). Indeed, his work can be 
seen as a lifetime effort to create a better behavioural micro-foundation to macroeconomics – 
continuing in the tradition started by Keynes’ (1936) General Theory.  
 
Caste and identities 
In subsequent work the ‘lemons’ paper was soon developed into an analysis of caste systems 
(1976; 1985), in which irrational and economically inefficient belief systems can be sustained 
out of a concern for individual well-being, albeit at the cost of society's overall welfare. This 
work is typical of Akerlof's approach to economic theory in that it seeks to broaden our view of 
economic exchange from the simplistic dyad of buyer and seller (the focus of so much economic 
analysis) to admit the real possibility that such exchanges are heavily conditioned by the 
existence of wider social forces. In this specific case, people adhere to what are obviously 
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dysfunctional behaviours because, in their individual calculus, the costs of being seen to break 
such conventions (and hence being outcaste) outweigh any individual short-term gains. Thus, 
individually rational action leads to a macroeconomically inefficient outcome.  
More generally, people can be seen as exhibiting patterns of behaviour that are consistent with 
chosen identities but would be otherwise difficult to explain (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). Such 
identities are chosen in an attempt to fit most comfortably into society, given people's individual 
circumstances. The choice of identity brings with it a set of behaviours and an exposure to the 
behaviour of others with whom one identifies. This stream of work represents a major step in 
bridging the gap between economics and sociology that is so aptly summarized by James 
Duesenberry (quoted in Granovetter, 1985, p. 485): ‘economics is all about how people make 
choices; sociology is all about how they don't have any choices to make.’  
This approach led Akerlof to empirical analyses of the dramatic rise in out-of-wedlock births 
(Akerlof, Yellen and Katz, 1996) and the marked increase in the number of men living without 
children (1998). These papers demonstrate that the rise of children born to unmarried mothers 
and the increase in men living outside of households with children can each be ascribed to 
changing norms (the notion of the shotgun marriage and the destigmatization of out-of-wedlock 
births) that have more to do with changing technology (birth control) and the social reaction to 
these changes than to any wealth or incentive effects arising from welfare programmes.  
This enthusiasm to engage with real-world data and empirical work is another salient 
characteristic of Akerlof's work. Somewhat unusually, for a theorist of major repute, he has 
throughout his career undertaken empirical studies of the major social and economic policy 
issues of the day. Thus, in addition to the analysis of family structure and poverty mentioned 
above, he has studied the distribution of employment and unemployment experience (Akerlof 
and Main, 1980, 1981), job mobility (Akerlof, Rose and Yellen, 1988), German reunification 
(Akerlof, Rose, Yellen, and Hessenius, 1991), financial malfeasance (Akerlof and Romer, 1993), 
and the inflation-unemployment trade-off (Akerlof, Dickens and Perry, 1996, 2000). Akerlof's 
intellectually open and outgoing approach to his work also shows in the wide range of co-authors 
involved in his theoretical work, including, for example, Akerlof and Miyazaki (1980), Akerlof 
and Milbourne (1980), Akerlof and Katz (1989), Akerlof and Yellen (1990), and Akerlof and 
Kranton (2005). As will be seen below, his collaboration with Janet Yellen has been the most 
sustained and intellectually productive.  
 
Near-rational economic behaviour 
While the ‘lemons’ paper is undoubtedly his most famous, the stream of papers that best 
demonstrates Akerlof's New Keynesian pedigree starts with Akerlof (1969). This paper 
investigates structural unemployment in a framework that sees firms as being in monopolistic 
competition and having staggered price setting, with wages emerging as bargains struck between 
firms and workers. With Taylor's (1979) incorporation of rational expectations, this links directly 
to the overlapping contracts approach that now lies at the heart of the New Keynesian model. 
Akerlof also deployed this approach in the study of monetary policy (1973; 1978; 1979). Here, 
simple monitoring rules by agents of their bank balances are shown to make both monetary and 
fiscal policy effective.  
Extending this approach more generally, Akerlof and Yellen (1985) demonstrate that what 
appear as rule-of-thumb behavioural rules deployed in economic decision-making actually bring 
with them substantial savings in computational costs (and deal with the bounded rationality 
problem) while, at the same time, imposing only second-order costs on the agent by way of lost 
economic efficiency. In this sense, such rules of thumb are quite sustainable and sensible modes 
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of behaviour. The insights of this paper have far-reaching implications. Accepting the existence 
of such behaviour not only points to why monetary policy might be effective but also explains 
why there can, indeed, be significant trade-offs between inflation and unemployment, 
particularly at low rates of inflation (Akerlof, Dickens and Perry, 1996, 2000).  
Friedman's (1968) original attack on the notion of a long-run trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment was further strengthened by the incorporation of rational expectations by the New 
Classical economists, Lucas (1972) and Sargent (1971). Deploying the Akerlof and Yellen 
(1985) insight of near-rational behaviour towards inflation, Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (2000) 
demonstrate that at low rates of inflation, such as were typical in the 1950s and are now 
prevalent once again, there can be an empirically significant trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment. The fact is that in setting wages and prices economic agents (business people, 
wage negotiators and so on) do not behave exactly as economic models of rational expectations 
would suggest – at least not when inflation is moderate and the costs of deviating from such 
rationality are modest when compared with the informational and computational costs involved.  
 
Sociologically based efficiency wage theory 
In attempts to explain the unemployment that fiscal and monetary policy is often deployed to 
remedy, a standard question is why in the face of unemployment wages do not simply decline, so 
restoring equilibrium in the market. The answer is, of course, that cheaper is not always better. In 
a paper evocatively titled ‘Jobs as dam sites’, Akerlof (1981) explains that, just as it makes poor 
economic sense to construct a lower-quality dam on a prime site (no matter that it may be 
cheaper), so it may not make economic sense to hire cheaper labour even when available. These 
ideas, further developed in Akerlof (1982) and most elegantly expressed in Akerlof and Yellen 
(1990), provide a sociologically rooted explanation for efficiency wages.  
The key idea here is that the exchange between employer and employee is rich and complex, 
extending well beyond the narrow instrumental delivery of labour in return for wages. Workers 
who display ‘consummate’ cooperation in playing their part to achieve the objectives of the 
organization are much preferred to those exhibiting ‘perfunctory’ cooperation (see Williamson, 
Wachter and Harris, 1975, p. 266). Part of the key to ensuring the higher-productivity outcome is 
being seen to pay a fair wage. The concept of fair wage-effort is socially determined, and both 
equity theory from social psychology and social exchange theory from sociology offer 
explanations of how workers react when this balance is disturbed. From this perspective, the 
financial savings from lowering wages can be a poor bargain when set against the impact on the 
productivity of the workforce. In the face of such rigidity coming about through the individually 
rational decisions of employers, there is clear scope for macroeconomic policy to effect a 
coordinated move to a higher level of employment. This is a key insight of the efficiency wage 
model of the labour market (Akerlof and Yellen, 1986).  
 
Psychologically based models 
The incorporation of psychological insights into economics has proved highly successful in 
recent years, as indicated by the award of the Nobel Prize in 2002 to Daniel Kahneman. Akerlof 
and Dickens (1982) is an early contribution to this movement, drawing on the notion of cognitive 
dissonance whereby individuals choose their beliefs or view of a situation in such a way that 
renders them the greatest comfort or happiness. In this way, it is possible to explain many 
common phenomena that otherwise seem to make little economic sense, such as the widespread 
flouting of workplace safety standards. In some ways the more recent work in Akerlof and 
Kranton (2005) on choice of identity can be seen as a sociological version of this same 
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phenomenon. The common theme is that social actors are capable of choosing the frame through 
which they view their circumstances and, unsurprisingly, can be expected to choose an approach 
that, given the situation in which they find themselves, offers them the greatest comfort. To an 
external observer this can often result in behaviours that are perplexing.  
Thus, in Akerlof (1991) a psychologically based explanation is offered for the widely 
documented phenomenon of people acting in ways that seem too short-sighted to be in their 
interest. This is seen in the widespread failure to make adequate provision for retirement or to 
save enough in general. Drawing on a personal experience during a year living in India during 
the late 1960s, Akerlof recounts how day after day he procrastinated over mailing off a promised 
package to Joseph Stiglitz. This is developed into a model that demonstrates why in repeatedly 
opting for what appears as the best short-term course of action (to procrastinate) one is often left 
in a situation that in retrospect one may regret. The insights offered by this model of economic 
behaviour are both powerful and far-reaching, and later proponents, such as David Laibson 
(1997), have extended the area into neurological studies of the brain under the heading 
‘neuroeconomics’.  
 
Conclusion 
If economists were ever to adapt the psychologist's stimulus-response technique into a game of 
declaring a famous economist's name as a stimulus and then noting the response, it seems clear 
that the overwhelming response to ‘George Akerlof’ would be ‘lemons’. This would, at the same 
time, be both a sufficient response and an insufficient response. As the above discussion has 
shown, it is insufficient to try to capture such a major body of important studies by reference to 
one paper. Akerlof has not only dealt with asymmetric information but, as a major contributor to 
modern Keynesian economics, has also confronted the major macroeconomic issues of the day, 
most notably by providing the behavioural underpinnings to explain the efficacy of 
interventionist economic policy.  
Yet the ‘lemons’ response could arguably be judged sufficient in the sense that the ‘lemons’ 
paper contains all of the elements that make Akerlof's approach to economic theory so different 
and so potent. Mark Granovetter (1985) criticizes economic models as either totally ignoring the 
influence of social structures and relations or else going to the other extreme, by being 
oversocialized in the sense that there are really no choices left for agents to make. Akerlof is one 
of a small but growing set of economists who manage to position their models on the middle 
ground. Far from Friedman's (1953) positive economics approach, which regards assumptions as 
something to be minimized and whose realism is of no consequence as long as the predictive 
power of the model holds up, Akerlof adheres to an approach that utilizes models based on 
closely observed empirical examples. The fact that the most observers believe that monopolistic 
competition is the norm means to Akerlof that such a feature must appear in the model. A model 
utilizing perfect competition might be able to do just as well, but would be rejected in the face of 
Akerlof's pragmatic goal of making his models as near to the observed reality as possible while 
still being tractable.  
‘The market for “lemons”’ will almost certainly stand as Akerlof's best-known contribution, 
having provided the impetus for radical new ways of looking at events in so many areas of 
economics. But it is also an excellent exemplar of a different approach to economic modelling. It 
is this pragmatic approach to economic modelling that makes all of Akerlof's contributions so 
worthwhile.  
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